[PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on untrusted filesystems

Mimi Zohar zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Wed Feb 21 23:03:13 UTC 2018


On Wed, 2018-02-21 at 16:53 -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> > On Mon, 2018-02-19 at 20:02 -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> It would also be nice if I could provide all of this information at
> >> mount time (when I am the global root) with mount options.  So I don't
> >> need to update all of my tooling to know how to update ima policy when I
> >> am mounting a filesystem.
> >
> > The latest version of this patch relies on a builtin IMA policy to set
> > a flag.  No other changes are required to the IMA policy.  This
> > builtin policy could be used for environments not willing to accept
> > the default unverifiable signature risk.
> 
> I still remain puzzled by this.  Why is the default to accept the risk?

Accepting the risk is option 2, the privileged mount scenario.  It
requires re-evaluating the cached info.

Mimi

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