[GIT PULL] Integrity: IMA FUSE fixes

Linus Torvalds torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Sun Feb 11 04:50:01 UTC 2018


On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>> What am I missing?
>
> No, you're right.  The file could change at any time, making the
> measurement(s) and by extension signature verification meaningless.
> Custom policy rules could be defined to disable measurement,
> appraisal, and audit for files on fuse.  However, I don't think we
> want to automatically disable measurement, even meaningless
> measurements.  Some indication needs to be included for remote
> attestation, security analytics, or forensics.  For systems with
> policies that require file signatures even on fuse, the safest thing
> would seem to be to fail the signature verification.

Failing seems like a sane model, although I also suspect it would just
break a lot of cases that currently work fine because *in*practice*
fuse works fine as a normal filesystem (think fuse "exfat" module
etc).

So yes, the failing behavior is sane, but I agree with you that it
should be something that requires a specific policy ("fail on
untrusted filesystems like fuse").

But regardless, disabling caching just seems broken in all situations
and never right, so I really don't want to pull that tree unless
somebody can point out where it makes sense.

             Linus
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