[RFC PATCH] ima: force the re-evaluation of files on untrusted file systems
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Mon Feb 5 16:37:40 UTC 2018
On Mon, 2018-02-05 at 17:30 +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2018-02-05 at 17:12 +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> >> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 4:50 PM, James Bottomley
> >> <James.Bottomley at hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, 2018-02-05 at 08:40 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> >> On filesystems, such as fuse or remote filesystems, that we can not
> >> >> detect or rely on the filesystem to tell us when a file has changed,
> >> >> always re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit the file.
> >> >
> >> > Using the presence or absence of d_revalidate isn't definitive for
> >> > uncacheable appraisals: all stacked filesystems have to implement
> >> > d_revalidate just in case the underlying has it, but it doesn't mean
> >> > their appraisals can't be cached if they're fully built on top of
> >> > traditional filesystems (like they are in the Docker/OCI use case). I
> >> > think the original flag approach is better. The only thing stackable
> >> > filesystems argues for is that for them it should probably be a
> >> > superblock flag so it can be per-mount point (depending on overlay
> >> > composition).
> >> >
> >> > d_revalidate() also strikes me as wrong from the semantic point of
> >> > view: it's about whether the path name to inode cache needs re-
> >> > evaluating not whether the underlying inode could change arbitrarily.
> >> > These are definitely related but not necessarily equivalent concepts.
> >>
> >> True. A more precise indication is whether cache pages have been
> >> invalidated for a certain inode. Can we used that? I.e.
> >> invalidate_inode_pages*() calls down into IMA or sets a flags or
> >> whatever to indicate that the file contents might have changed.
> >
> > I don't think that works for the FUSE use case.
>
> Okay, it's true that cache invalidation is just a hint about file
> contents changing. The file contents could change without cache
> invalidation if userspace filesystem is buggy or malicious.
Right, the untrusted, malicious userspace filesystem is the reason for
Alban's patches. Can you review/ack those patches?
thanks,
Mimi
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