[RFC v2 09/13] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's

[Peter Zijlstra]

On Mon, Dec 03, 2018 at 11:39:56PM -0800, Alison Schofield wrote:
> Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
> Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
> make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
> 
> The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
> any VMA's if this check fails.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield at intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov at linux.intel.com>

That SoB doesn't make sense; per the From you wrote the patch and signed
off on it, wth is Kirill's SoB doing there?

> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index ad8127dc9aac..f1c009409134 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -345,6 +345,24 @@ static int prot_none_walk(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
>  	return walk_page_range(start, end, &prot_none_walk);
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
> + * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
> + * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
> + */
> +bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)

That's a 'weird' interface and cannot do what the comment says it should
do.

> +{
> +	struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;

That variable is utterly pointless.

> +	do {
> +		if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
> +			return false;
> +
> +		test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
> +	} while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
> +	return true;
> +}