[PATCH 3/4] ima: add support for KEXEC_ORIG_KERNEL_CHECK

[Seth Forshee]

On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 06:31:59PM -0500, Eric Richter wrote:
> IMA can verify the signature of kernel images loaded with kexec_file_load,
> but can not verify images loaded with the regular kexec_load syscall.
> Therefore, the appraisal will automatically fail during kexec_load when an
> appraise policy rule is set for func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK. This can be used
> to effectively disable the kexec_load syscall, while still allowing the
> kexec_file_load to operate so long as the target kernel image is signed.
> 
> However, this conflicts with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. If that option is
> enabled and there is an appraise rule set, then the target kernel would
> have to be verifiable by both IMA and the architecture specific kernel
> verification procedure.
> 
> This patch adds a new func= for IMA appraisal specifically for the original
> kexec_load syscall. Therefore, the kexec_load syscall can be effectively
> disabled via IMA policy, leaving the kexec_file_load syscall able to do its
> own signature verification, and not require it to be signed via IMA. To
> retain compatibility, the existing func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK flag is
> unchanged, and thus enables appraisal for both kexec syscalls.

This seems like a roundabout way to disallow the kexec_load syscall.
Wouldn't it make more sense to simply disallow kexec_load any time
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, since it effectively renders that
option impotent? Or has that idea already been rejected?

Thanks,
Seth
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