[PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root

Kees Cook keescook at chromium.org
Wed Sep 20 22:25:15 UTC 2017

On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 3:11 PM, Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com> wrote:
>> Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
>> root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
>> BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls.  This meant that any setuid root
>> applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
>> necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
>> records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
>> id.
>> Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
>> unnecessary record.
>> Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
>> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
>> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris at oracle.com>
>> ---
>>  security/commoncap.c |    5 ++---
>>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
> code as much as I dislike the audit code.

Read binfmt_elf.c and your journey towards the dark side will be complete!


Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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