[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
Mon Sep 18 09:04:55 UTC 2017
On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Samstag, 16. September 2017, 15:00:34 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> Hi Jason,
> > This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
> > get_random_bytes_wait,
> This change is a challenge. The use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG has been
> made to allow FIPS 140-2 compliance. Otherwise, the entire key generation
> logic will not be using the right(TM) DRNG. Thus, I would not suggest to
> replace that for a stable tree.
Why not? What is the issue here, there is only one "DRNG" in the kernel
now (and probably for a long time...)
> Note, I am currently working on a pluggable DRNG apporach for /dev/random and
> /dev/urandom to be able to get rid of the use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG
> API. It is ready and I will air that solution shortly. Yet, it needs work to
> be integrated upstream (and approval from Ted Tso).
We don't postpone work for potential future patches that might or might
not ever happen or get merged. That's how NetBSD died...
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