[PATCH 2/3] security: bpf: Add eBPF LSM hooks and security field to eBPF map

Chenbo Feng fengc at google.com
Tue Sep 5 21:59:38 UTC 2017

On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 01:56:34PM -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
>> From: Chenbo Feng <fengc at google.com>
>> Introduce a pointer into struct bpf_map to hold the security information
>> about the map. The actual security struct varies based on the security
>> models implemented. Place the LSM hooks before each of the unrestricted
>> eBPF operations, the map_update_elem and map_delete_elem operations are
>> checked by security_map_modify. The map_lookup_elem and map_get_next_key
>> operations are checked by securtiy_map_read.
>> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc at google.com>
> ...
>> @@ -410,6 +418,10 @@ static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
>>       if (IS_ERR(map))
>>               return PTR_ERR(map);
>> +     err = security_map_read(map);
>> +     if (err)
>> +             return -EACCES;
>> +
>>       key = memdup_user(ukey, map->key_size);
>>       if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>>               err = PTR_ERR(key);
>> @@ -490,6 +502,10 @@ static int map_update_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
>>       if (IS_ERR(map))
>>               return PTR_ERR(map);
>> +     err = security_map_modify(map);
> I don't feel these extra hooks are really thought through.
> With such hook you'll disallow map_update for given map. That's it.
> The key/values etc won't be used in such security decision.
> In such case you don't need such hooks in update/lookup at all.
> Only in map_creation and object_get calls where FD can be received.
> In other words I suggest to follow standard unix practices:
> Do permissions checks in open() and allow read/write() if FD is valid.
> Same here. Do permission checks in prog_load/map_create/obj_pin/get
> and that will be enough to jail bpf subsystem.
> bpf cmds that need to be fast (like lookup and update) should not
> have security hooks.
Thanks for pointing out this. I agree we should only do checks on
creating and passing
the object from one processes to another. And if we can still
distinguish the read/write operation
when obtaining the file fd, that would be great. But that may require
us to add a new mode
field into bpf_map struct and change the attribute struct when doing
the bpf syscall. How do you
think about this approach? Or we can do simple checks for
bpf_obj_create and bpf_obj_use when
creating the object and passing the object respectively but this
solution cannot distinguish map modify and
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list