Fixing CVE-2017-15361

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 03:46:26PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 12:26:10AM +0200, Peter Huewe wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Am 25. Oktober 2017 20:53:49 MESZ schrieb Jarkko Sakkinen
> > <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com>:
> > > >On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 07:17:17AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > >> On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 6:44 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > > >> <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > >> > I'm implementing a fix for CVE-2017-15361 that simply blacklists
> > > >> > vulnerable FW versions. I think this is the only responsible action
> > > >from
> > > >> > my side that I can do.
> > > >>
> > > >> I'm not sure this is ideal - do Infineon have any Linux tooling for
> > > >> performing firmware updates, and if so will that continue working if
> > > >> the device is blacklisted? It's also a poor user experience to have
> > > >> systems using TPM-backed disk encryption keys suddenly rendered
> > > >> unbootable, and making it as easy as possible for people to do an
> > > >> upgrade and then re-seal secrets with new keys feels like the correct
> > > >> approach.
> > > >
> > > >I talked today with Alexander Steffen in the KS unconference and we
> > > >concluded that this would be a terrible idea.
> > > >
> > > >Alexander stated the following things about FW updates (Alexander,
> > > >please correct me if I state something incorrectly or if you have
> > > >something to add):
> > > >
> > > >* FW update can be constructed either in a way that the keys in the
> > > >  NVRAM are not cleared or in a way that they are cleared.
> > > >* FW update cannot be directly applied to the TPM but must come as
> > > >  part of the firmware update from the vendor.
> > > >
> > > >I proposed the following as an alternative:
> > > >
> > > >* Print a message to the klog (which log level would be appropriate?).
> > > Info?
> > > Maybe warn, definitely not err
> > 
> > Since the driver does not fail usually warn would make sense but since
> > here even allowing to continue to use such TPM is questionable I would
> > use error here.
> > 
> > People anyway ignore klog too easily so using warn would be a mistake in
> > my opinion. It's like saying that nothing serious is happening here,
> > move along.
> > 
> > Do you think so?
> > 
> > > >* Possibly sleep for few seconds. Is this a good idea?
> > > Helps how?
> > 
> > Obviously to get it noticed that the system integrity is broken.
> > 
> > > >While writing this email yet another alternative popped into my mind:
> > > >what if we allow only in-kernel use but disallow the use of /dev/tpm0?
> > > >You could still use trusted keys.
> > > >
> > > No, same terrible idea since you block the upgrade path.
> > > Upgrade tools work from userspace via the kernel driver.
> > > So /dev/tpm0 is necessary.
> > 
> > Right! How stupid of me (my previous response to Jerry) :-) Of course you
> > can have special commands and talk to the TPM to do the upgrade even if
> > it is part of the platform and not connected to a standard bus.
> > 
> > I got understanding in the yesterdays unconfernce discussion that it
> > should be part of the firmware upgrade.
> 
> Yes, but it really depends on the way the vendor chooses to do the
> upgrade. UEFI Capsules would be one standard way that does not involve
> the Linux driver. But maybe you are on some embedded ARM platform
> without UEFI, then you can also run the upgrade through /dev/tpm0, so
> that you do not need to invent another way to talk to the TPM.
> 
> This second option does have the drawback of the Linux driver not
> being aware of the upgrade happening. It does not know that while the
> TPM is in the upgrade mode no other commands can be executed. Neither
> does it know that after the upgrade the system needs to be rebooted
> before the TPM can be used again (so that for example the PCRs have
> the correct values again). I want to look into those issues in the
> future.

This dilates me even more to the standpoint that user space is better
place for sorting out this issue.

/Jarkko
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