[PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
Ethan Zhao
ethan.kernel at gmail.com
Tue Oct 24 10:48:44 UTC 2017
David,
May I ask a question here -- Is it intentionally enabling the
read-only mode, so userspace
tools like dmidecode could work with kernel_is_locked_down ? while it
was impossible to work
with the attached patch applied. Is it a security policy change with
secure boot ?
Thanks,
Ethan
On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 10:34 PM, David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com> wrote:
> I think I should replace this patch with the attached. This will prevent
> /dev/mem, /dev/kmem and /dev/port from being *opened*, and thereby preventing
> read, write and ioctl.
>
> David
> ---
> commit e68daa2256986932b9a7d6709cf9e24b30d93583
> Author: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett at nebula.com>
> Date: Wed May 24 14:56:02 2017 +0100
>
> Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down
>
> Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
> for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
> also to steal cryptographic information.
>
> Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
> been locked down to prevent this.
>
> Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
> thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett at nebula.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee at suse.com>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
> index 593a8818aca9..0ce5ac0a5c6b 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/mem.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
> @@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
>
> static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> {
> + if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/mem,kmem,port"))
> + return -EPERM;
> return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
> }
>
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