[tpmdd-devel] [PATCH] tpm: remove chip_num parameter from in-kernel API
Stefan Berger
stefanb at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Mon Oct 23 14:07:31 UTC 2017
On 10/23/2017 08:38 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> The reasoning is simple and obvious. Since every call site passes the
> value TPM_ANY_NUM (0xFFFF) the parameter does not have right to exist.
> Refined the documentation of the corresponding functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 38 ++++++++--------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/tpm.h | 43 ++++++++----------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +-
> security/keys/trusted.c | 35 ++++++++-------
> 9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> index d6d448266f07..8823efcddab8 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/tpm-rng.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>
> static int tpm_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
> {
> - return tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, data, max);
> + return tpm_get_random(data, max);
> }
>
> static struct hwrng tpm_rng = {
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> index a114e8f7fb90..ec351111643b 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> @@ -81,34 +81,32 @@ void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_put_ops);
>
> /**
> - * tpm_chip_find_get() - return tpm_chip for a given chip number
> - * @chip_num: id to find
> + * tpm_chip_find_get() - reserved the first available TPM chip
> *
> - * The return'd chip has been tpm_try_get_ops'd and must be released via
> - * tpm_put_ops
> + * Finds the first available TPM chip and reserves its class device and
> + * operations.
> + *
> + * Return: a reserved &struct tpm_chip instance
> */
> -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
> +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void)
> {
> - struct tpm_chip *chip, *res = NULL;
> + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> + struct tpm_chip *res = NULL;
> int chip_prev;
> + int chip_num;
>
> mutex_lock(&idr_lock);
>
> - if (chip_num == TPM_ANY_NUM) {
> - chip_num = 0;
> - do {
> - chip_prev = chip_num;
> - chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
> - if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
> - res = chip;
> - break;
> - }
> - } while (chip_prev != chip_num);
> - } else {
> - chip = idr_find(&dev_nums_idr, chip_num);
> - if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip))
> + chip_num = 0;
> +
> + do {
> + chip_prev = chip_num;
> + chip = idr_get_next(&dev_nums_idr, &chip_num);
> + if (chip && !tpm_try_get_ops(chip)) {
> res = chip;
> - }
> + break;
> + }
> + } while (chip_prev != chip_num);
>
> mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
Here you are keeping the loop, which I think is good and I would like
you to keep it...
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> index d8e2e5bca903..b3907d3556ce 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -802,18 +802,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> }
>
> /**
> - * tpm_is_tpm2 - is the chip a TPM2 chip?
> - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY
> + * tpm_is_tpm2 - do we a have a TPM2 chip?
> *
> - * Returns < 0 on error, and 1 or 0 on success depending whether the chip
> - * is a TPM2 chip.
> + * Return:
> + * 1 if we have a TPM2 chip.
> + * 0 if we don't have a TPM2 chip.
> + * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> */
> -int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
> +int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> int rc;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL)
> return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -826,22 +827,18 @@ int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_is_tpm2);
>
> /**
> - * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
> - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY
> - * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to retrieve
> - * @res_buf: TPM_PCR value
> - * size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
> + * tpm_pcr_read - read a PCR value from SHA1 bank
> + * @pcr_idx: the PCR to be retrieved
> + * @res_buf: the value of the PCR
> *
> - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
> - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
> - * the module usage count.
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
> */
> -int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> +int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> int rc;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL)
> return -ENODEV;
> if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
> @@ -882,16 +879,17 @@ static int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
> }
>
> /**
> - * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
> - * @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN&
> - * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to extend
> - * @hash: hash value used to extend pcr value
> + * tpm_pcr_extend - extend a PCR value in SHA1 bank.
> + * @pcr_idx: the PCR to be retrieved
> + * @hash: the hash value used to extend the PCR value
> + *
> + * Note: with TPM 2.0 extends also those banks with a known digest size to the
> + * cryto subsystem in order to prevent malicious use of those PCR banks. In the
> + * future we should dynamically determine digest sizes.
> *
> - * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
> - * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
> - * the module usage count.
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
> */
> -int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> +int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> {
I think every kernel internal TPM driver API should be called with the
tpm_chip as a parameter. This is in foresight of namespacing of IMA
where we want to provide the flexibility of passing a dedicated vTPM to
each namespace and IMA would use the chip as a parameter to all of these
functions to talk to the right tpm_vtpm_proxy instance. From that
perspective this patch goes into the wrong direction.
Stefan
> int rc;
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> @@ -899,7 +897,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> u32 count = 0;
> int i;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL)
> return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1012,12 +1010,12 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> return rc;
> }
>
> -int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> +int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> int rc;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL)
> return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1120,14 +1118,13 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
> };
>
> /**
> - * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_get_random() - acquire random bytes
> * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
> * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
> *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
> */
> -int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
> +int tpm_get_random(u8 *out, size_t max)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
> @@ -1138,7 +1135,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
> if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL)
> return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1181,21 +1178,22 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
>
> /**
> - * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload
> * @options: authentication values and other options
> * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
> *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
> - * are supported.
> + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
> + * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
> + *
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
> */
> -int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> int rc;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
> return -ENODEV;
>
> @@ -1207,21 +1205,22 @@ int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted);
>
> /**
> - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key
> - * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
> + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key payload
> * @options: authentication values and other options
> * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
> *
> - * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips
> - * are supported.
> + * Note: at the moment, only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation
> + * is still located in the keyring subsystem.
> + *
> + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
> */
> -int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> struct tpm_chip *chip;
> int rc;
>
> - chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
> + chip = tpm_chip_find_get();
> if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2))
> return -ENODEV;
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index c1866cc02e30..269c32bb3af0 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)
> delay_msec * 1000);
> };
>
> -struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num);
> +struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(void);
> __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 5a090f5ab335..54cd6d903d31 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -24,11 +24,6 @@
>
> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
>
> -/*
> - * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
> - */
> -#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
> -
> struct tpm_chip;
> struct trusted_key_payload;
> struct trusted_key_options;
> @@ -53,44 +48,42 @@ struct tpm_class_ops {
> };
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
> -
> -extern int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num);
> -extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
> -extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
> -extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
> -extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max);
> -extern int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> - struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +extern int tpm_is_tpm2(void);
> +extern int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
> +extern int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
> +extern int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen);
> +extern int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max);
> +extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> -extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> - struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> #else
> -static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num)
> +static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(void)
> {
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
> +static inline int tpm_pcr_read(int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
> +{
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
> +static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
> +{
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
> +static inline int tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> +{
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) {
> +static inline int tpm_get_random(u8 *data, size_t max)
> +{
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -
> -static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> - struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> return -ENODEV;
> }
> -static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num,
> - struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> +static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> return -ENODEV;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> index 802d5d20f36f..b5828bafab26 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
> if (!ima_used_chip)
> return;
>
> - if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
> + if (tpm_pcr_read(idx, pcr) != 0)
> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 2967d497a665..21be72f604cd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
> int rc;
>
> ima_used_chip = 0;
> - rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
> + rc = tpm_pcr_read(0, pcr_i);
> if (rc == 0)
> ima_used_chip = 1;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index a02a86d51102..d33966ff210d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
> if (!ima_used_chip)
> return result;
>
> - result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
> + result = tpm_pcr_extend(pcr, hash);
> if (result != 0)
> pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
> return result;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index ddfaebf60fc8..f912b5bffdad 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
> * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
> * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
> */
> -static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
> - size_t buflen)
> +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> {
> int rc;
>
> dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> - rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
> + rc = tpm_send(cmd, buflen);
> dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> if (rc > 0)
> /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
> @@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
>
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + ret = tpm_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
> return ret;
> - return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
> + return tpm_pcr_extend(pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
> unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
> int ret;
>
> - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> + ret = tpm_get_random(ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
> return ret;
>
> @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
> store32(tb, handle);
> storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>
> - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
> store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
> store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
> store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
> - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> @@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
> if (ret < 0)
> goto out;
>
> - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> + ret = tpm_get_random(td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
> goto out;
> ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
> @@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
> store8(tb, cont);
> storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> if (ret < 0)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>
> ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
> keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
> - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> + ret = tpm_get_random(nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
> pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
> return ret;
> @@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
> store8(tb, cont);
> storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
> return ret;
> @@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> int i;
> int tpm2;
>
> - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return tpm2;
>
> @@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> struct trusted_key_options *options;
> int tpm2;
>
> - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return NULL;
>
> @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> size_t key_len;
> int tpm2;
>
> - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
> + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2();
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return tpm2;
>
> @@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> switch (key_cmd) {
> case Opt_load:
> if (tpm2)
> - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
> + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(payload, options);
> else
> ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
> dump_payload(payload);
> @@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> break;
> case Opt_new:
> key_len = payload->key_len;
> - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
> + ret = tpm_get_random(payload->key, key_len);
> if (ret != key_len) {
> pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> if (tpm2)
> - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
> + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(payload, options);
> else
> ret = key_seal(payload, options);
> if (ret < 0)
--
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