[PATCH v5 18/18] ima: Write modsig to the measurement list
Thiago Jung Bauermann
bauerman at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Wed Oct 18 00:53:31 UTC 2017
Add modsig support for templates which require the contents of the file
signature to be included in the measurement list.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 12 ++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index b082138461b3..68f471666151 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void);
void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
+bool ima_current_template_has_sig(void);
int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
int *xattr_len);
int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo,
void const **hash, u8 *len);
+int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len);
int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);
void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);
@@ -334,6 +336,12 @@ static inline int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr,
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
+static inline int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data,
+ int *data_len)
+{
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c6d346e9f708..59a5b044b48b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -284,7 +284,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
xattr_len, NULL};
int violation = 0;
- if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
+ /*
+ * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
+ * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
+ * appraisal. See comment in process_measurement for more details.
+ */
+ if ((iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) &&
+ (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != IMA_MODSIG))
return;
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6a2d960fbd92..0d3390de7432 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -246,7 +246,35 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, buf, size,
pathname, &xattr_value,
&xattr_len, opened);
- if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+
+ /*
+ * MODSIG has one corner case we need to deal with here:
+ *
+ * Suppose the policy has one measure rule for one hook and an appraise
+ * rule for a different hook. Suppose also that the template requires
+ * the signature to be stored in the measurement list.
+ *
+ * If a file containing a MODSIG is measured by the first hook before
+ * being appraised by the second one, the corresponding entry in the
+ * measurement list will not contain the MODSIG because we only fetch it
+ * for IMA_APPRAISAL. We don't fetch it earlier because if the file has
+ * both a DIGSIG and a MODSIG it's not possible to know which one will
+ * be valid without actually doing the appraisal.
+ *
+ * Therefore, after appraisal of a MODSIG signature we need to store the
+ * measurement again if the current template requires storing the
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * With the opposite ordering (the appraise rule triggering before the
+ * measurement rule) there is the same problem but it's not possible to
+ * do anything about it because at the time we are appraising the
+ * signature it's impossible to know whether a measurement will ever
+ * need to be stored for this file.
+ */
+ if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) || ((iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+ xattr_value &&
+ xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG &&
+ ima_current_template_has_sig()))
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index 2786aa97060e..82c3e2693982 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ struct modsig_hdr {
const void *data; /* Pointer to data covered by pkcs7_msg. */
size_t data_len;
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg;
+ int raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+ /* This will be in the measurement list if required by the template. */
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data raw_pkcs7;
};
/**
@@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
- hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -97,6 +101,10 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
return rc;
}
+ memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7.data, buf + buf_len, sig_len);
+ hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len + 1;
+ hdr->raw_pkcs7.type = IMA_MODSIG;
+
hdr->type = IMA_MODSIG;
hdr->data = buf;
hdr->data_len = buf_len;
@@ -129,6 +137,16 @@ int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo,
return 0;
}
+int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len)
+{
+ struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) *data;
+
+ *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7;
+ *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 3cc1d2763fd2..a5bad6996334 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -228,6 +228,18 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
return ima_template;
}
+bool ima_current_template_has_sig(void)
+{
+ struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "sig"))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
int __init ima_init_template(void)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index e8ec783b6a8d..d0e85def0ae9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -379,10 +379,23 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
+ int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
- if (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
+ if (!is_ima_sig(xattr_value))
return 0;
- return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
+ /*
+ * The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing
+ * pointers. Get its raw data instead.
+ */
+ if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) {
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ima_modsig_serialize_data(&xattr_value, &xattr_len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len,
DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
}
--
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