Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown

[Mimi Zohar]

On Tue, 2017-11-14 at 13:38 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 07:21:38AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2017-11-13 at 14:09 -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > > On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 1:44 PM, David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Whilst that may be true, we either have to check signatures on every bit of
> > > > firmware that the appropriate driver doesn't say is meant to be signed or not
> > > > bother.
> > > 
> > > I vote for "not bother".
> > > 
> > > Seriously, if you have firmware in /lib/firmware, and you don't trust
> > > it, what the hell are you doing?
> > 
> > I might "trust" the files in /lib/firmware, but I also want to make
> > sure that they haven't changed.  File signatures provide file
> > provenance and integrity guarantees.
> 
> Then "verify" them with signatures that you generate yourself.  Like
> dm-verify does for the partition that you put the firmware on.

The discussion, here, is in the context of the "lockdown" patch set,
without IMA-appraisal configured.  Kernel modules and the kexec kernel
image require file signatures in lockdown mode.  An equivalent method
of requiring file signatures for firmware (without IMA-appraisal) does
not exist.

I posted the patch [RFC PATCH v2] "fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module
to prevent loading unsigned firmware".  The patch and discussion can
be found here - (https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/13/217).

Mimi

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