[PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN

[Matt Brown]

On 05/16/2017 05:43 PM, Peter Dolding wrote:
> On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 12:28 AM, Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 5:22 AM, Matt Brown <matt at nmatt.com> wrote:
>>> On 05/16/2017 05:01 AM, Peter Dolding wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I could see a case being make for CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG. However I still
>>>>> choose to do with CAP_SYS_ADMIN because it is already in use in the
>>>>> TIOCSTI ioctl.
>>>>>
>>>> Matt Brown don't give me existing behaviour.    CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
>>>> overload.   The documentation tells you that you are not to expand it
>>>> and you openly admit you have.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is not true that I'm openly going against what the documentation
>>> instructs. The part of the email chain where I show this got removed
>>> somehow. Again I will refer to the capabilities man page that you
>>> quoted.
>>>
>>> From http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>>>
>>> "Don't choose CAP_SYS_ADMIN if you can possibly avoid it!
>>> ...
>>> The only new features that should be associated with CAP_SYS_ADMIN are
>>> ones that closely match existing uses in that silo."
>>>
>>> My feature affects the TIOCSTI ioctl. The TIOCSTI ioctl already falls
>>> under CAP_SYS_ADMIN, therefore I actually *am* following the
>>> documentation.
>>
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN is the right choice here, I agree with Matt: it is
>> already in use for TIOCSTI. We can't trivially add new capabilities
>> flags (see the various giant threads debating this, the most recently
>> that I remember from the kernel lock-down series related to Secure
>> Boot).
>
> We cannot just keep on expanding CAP_SYS_ADMIN either.
>>
>>>> I fact this usage of TIOCSTI I personally think should require two
>>>> capabilities flags set.   CAP_SYS_ADMIN section left as it is at this
>>>> stage.   With TIOSCTI stuck behind another capability.
>>>>
>>>> If you had added a new capability flag you could set file capabilities
>>>> on any of the old applications depending on the now secured behaviour.
>>
>> If we're adjusting applications, they should be made to avoid TIOSCTI
>> completely. This looks to me a lot like the symlink restrictions: yes,
>> userspace should be fixed to the do the right thing, but why not
>> provide support to userspace to avoid the problem entirely?
>>
> Kees I like but you have forgot the all important rule.   The Linus
> Rule.    Existing applications must  have a method work.
>   So modify applications  binary is not way out of problem.
>
> Please note making CAP_SYS_ADMIN the only way to use TIOCSTI also
> means setting CAP_SYS_ADMIN on all the existing applications to obey
> the Linus Rule of not break userspace.   So this is why the patch is
> strictly no as this means elevating privilege of existing applications
> and possibly opening up more security flaws.

This feature is not required so it is not "making CAP_SYS_ADMIN the
only way to use TIOCSTI". It defaults to no as to not break some
existing programs that use it.

>
> Reality any patch like the one we are talking about due to the Linus
> Rule and the security risk it will open up obey this it just be
> rejected.   There is another kind of way I will cover with Serge.
>
> Peter Dolding.
>

Matt
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html