[PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities

[Casey Schaufler]

On 6/23/2017 11:35 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 06/23/2017 12:16 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 6/23/2017 9:00 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>> Quoting Amir Goldstein (amir73il at gmail.com):
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:59 PM, Stefan Berger
>>>>> <stefanb at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>>> This series of patches primary goal is to enable file capabilities
>>>>>> in user namespaces without affecting the file capabilities that are
>>>>>> effective on the host. This is to prevent that any unprivileged user
>>>>>> on the host maps his own uid to root in a private namespace, writes
>>>>>> the xattr, and executes the file with privilege on the host.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We achieve this goal by writing extended attributes with a different
>>>>>> name when a user namespace is used. If for example the root user
>>>>>> in a user namespace writes the security.capability xattr, the name
>>>>>> of the xattr that is actually written is encoded as
>>>>>> security.capability at uid=1000 for root mapped to uid 1000 on the host.
>>>>>> When listing the xattrs on the host, the existing security.capability
>>>>>> as well as the security.capability at uid=1000 will be shown. Inside the
>>>>>> namespace only 'security.capability', with the value of
>>>>>> security.capability at uid=1000, is visible.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Am I the only one who thinks that suffix is perhaps not the best grammar
>>>>> to use for this namespace?
>>>> You're the only one to have mentioned it so far.
>>>>
>>>>> xattrs are clearly namespaced by prefix, so it seems right to me to keep
>>>>> it that way - define a new special xattr namespace "ns" and only if that
>>>>> prefix exists, the @uid suffix will be parsed.
>>>>> This could be either  ns.security.capability at uid=1000 or
>>>>> ns at uid=1000.security.capability. The latter seems more correct to me,
>>>>> because then we will be able to namespace any xattr without having to
>>>>> protect from "unprivileged xattr injection", i.e.:
>>>>> setfattr -n "user.whatever.foo at uid=0"
>>>> I like it for simplifying the parser code.  One concern I have is that,
>>>> since ns.* is currently not gated, one could write ns.* on an older
>>>> kernel and then exploit it on a newer one.
>>> security.ns.capability at uid=1000, then?
>> Imo, '.ns' is redundant and 'encoded' in the '@'.
> So how about
> 	security. at uid=1000@@capability ?

You're back to messing up the final component of the
attribute name. If you want a namespace component, keep
it separate. I disagree with the ".ns" being redundant.
It's descriptive.

	security.ns at uid=1000@@.capability.

looks right to me.

>
> Maybe it's not worth it.
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html