[PATCH v2 1/6] integrity: Small code improvements

Mimi Zohar zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Thu Jun 15 16:00:45 UTC 2017


On Wed, 2017-06-07 at 22:49 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> These changes are too small to warrant their own patches:
> 
> The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format,
> so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu
> instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them.
> 
> Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char *
> buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer
> that isn't a char *.
> 
> Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to.
> 
> Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c.
> 
> Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Thank you.  Queued to be upstreamed.

Mimi


> ---
>  security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 ++--
>  security/integrity/iint.c              | 2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h           | 2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  | 1 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c    | 4 ++--
>  security/integrity/integrity.h         | 7 ++++---
>  6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 80052ed8d467..ab6a029062a1 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -92,13 +92,13 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> 
>  	siglen -= sizeof(*hdr);
> 
> -	if (siglen != __be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
> +	if (siglen != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
>  		return -EBADMSG;
> 
>  	if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
>  		return -ENOPKG;
> 
> -	key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, __be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
> +	key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
>  	if (IS_ERR(key))
>  		return PTR_ERR(key);
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index c710d22042f9..6fc888ca468e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
>   *
>   */
>  int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> -			  char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +			  void *addr, unsigned long count)
>  {
>  	mm_segment_t old_fs;
>  	char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d26a30e37d13..215a93c41b51 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> -#endif
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
> 
>  /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 7fe0566142d8..ea36a4f134f4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
>  	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
>  		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
>  		hash_start = 1;
> +		/* fall through */
>  	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
>  		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
>  			cause = "IMA-signature-required";
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 0acd68decb17..949ad3858327 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ enum {
>  	mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
>  };
> 
> -static char *mask_tokens[] = {
> +static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
>  	"MAY_EXEC",
>  	"MAY_WRITE",
>  	"MAY_READ",
> @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ enum {
>  	func_policy
>  };
> 
> -static char *func_tokens[] = {
> +static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
>  	"FILE_CHECK",
>  	"MMAP_CHECK",
>  	"BPRM_CHECK",
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 24520b4ef3b0..a53e7e4ab06c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
>  	uint8_t type;		/* xattr type */
>  	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
>  	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
> -	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
> -	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
> +	__be32 keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
> +	__be16 sig_size;	/* signature size */
>  	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
>  } __packed;
> 
> @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
>  struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
> 
>  int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> -			  char *addr, unsigned long count);
> +			  void *addr, unsigned long count);
> +
>  int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
> 
>  #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list