[PATCH v10 0/3] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data

[Igor Stoppa]

On 11/07/17 14:12, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Igor Stoppa wrote:
>> - I had to rebase Tetsuo Handa's patch because it didn't apply cleanly
>>   anymore, I would appreciate an ACK to that or a revised patch, whatever 
>>   comes easier.
> 
> Since we are getting several proposals of changing LSM hooks and both your proposal
> and Casey's "LSM: Security module blob management" proposal touch same files, I think
> we can break these changes into small pieces so that both you and Casey can make
> future versions smaller.
> 
> If nobody has objections about direction of Igor's proposal and Casey's proposal,
> I think merging only "[PATCH 2/3] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit
> array of struct list_head" from Igor's proposal and ->security accessor wrappers (e.g.

I would like to understand if there is still interest about:

* "[PATCH 1/3] Protectable memory support"  which was my main interest
* "[PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option"
  which was the example of how to use [1/3]

>   #define selinux_security(obj) (obj->security)
>   #define smack_security(obj) (obj->security)
>   #define tomoyo_security(obj) (obj->security)
>   #define apparmor_security(obj) (obj->security)

For example, I see that there are various kzalloc calls that might be
useful to turn into pmalloc ones.

In general, I'd think that, after a transient is complete, where modules
are loaded by allocating dynamic data structures, they could be locked
down in read-only mode.

I have the feeling that, now that I have polished up the pmalloc patch,
the proposed use case is fading away.

Can it be adjusted to the new situation or should I look elsewhere for
an example that would justify merging pmalloc?


thanks, igor
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