[PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier

[Eric W. Biederman]

Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> writes:

> There are several places where exec needs to know if a privilege-gain has
> happened. These should be using the results of security_bprm_secureexec()
> but it is getting (needlessly) called very late.

It is hard to tell at a glance but I believe this introduces a
regression.

cap_bprm_set_creds is currently called before cap_bprm_secureexec and
it has a number of cases such as no_new_privs and ptrace that can result
in some of the precomputed credential changes not happening.

Without accounting for that I believe your cap_bprm_securexec now
returns a postive value too early.

> Instead, move this earlier in the exec code, to the start of the point
> of no return in setup_new_exec(). Here, the new creds have already
> been calculated (and stored in bprm->cred), which is normally what
> security_bprm_secureexec() wants to examine. Since it's moved earlier,
> LSMs hooking bprm_secureexec() need to be adjusted to use the creds in
> bprm:
>
> $ git grep LSM_HOOK_INIT.*bprm_secureexec
> apparmor/lsm.c:    LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
> commoncap.c:       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
> selinux/hooks.c:   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
> smack/smack_lsm.c: LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
>
> AppArmor does not access creds in apparmor_bprm_secureexec.
>
> Capabilities needed to be adjusted to use bprm creds.
>
> SELinux needed to be adjusted to use bprm creds for the security structure.
>
> Smack needed to be adjusted to use bprm creds for the security structure.
>
> The result of the bprm_secureexec() hook is saved in a new bprm field
> "secureexec" so it can be queried later (just AT_SECURE currently).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> ---
>  fs/binfmt_elf.c            | 2 +-
>  fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c      | 2 +-
>  fs/exec.c                  | 5 +++++
>  include/linux/binfmts.h    | 3 ++-
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 3 ++-
>  security/commoncap.c       | 4 +---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   | 2 +-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
>  8 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> index 5075fd5c62c8..7f6ec4dac13d 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec,
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid));
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid));
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid));
> - 	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
> +	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, bprm->secureexec);
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes);
>  #ifdef ELF_HWCAP2
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP2, ELF_HWCAP2);
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
> index cf93a4fad012..5aa9199dfb13 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
> @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID,	(elf_addr_t) from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid));
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID,	(elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid));
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID,	(elf_addr_t) from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid));
> -	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE,	security_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
> +	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE,	bprm->secureexec);
>  	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN,	bprm->exec);
>  
>  #ifdef ARCH_DLINFO
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 7842ae661e34..b92e37fb53aa 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1337,6 +1337,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
>  
>  void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>  {
> +	if (security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)) {
> +		/* Record for AT_SECURE. */
> +		bprm->secureexec = 1;
> +	}
> +
>  	arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
>  
>  	current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
> diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
> index 05488da3aee9..1afaa303cad0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
> +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ struct linux_binprm {
>  	unsigned int
>  		cred_prepared:1,/* true if creds already prepared (multiple
>  				 * preps happen for interpreters) */
> -		cap_effective:1;/* true if has elevated effective capabilities,
> +		cap_effective:1,/* true if has elevated effective capabilities,
>  				 * false if not; except for init which inherits
>  				 * its parent's caps anyway */
> +		secureexec:1;	/* true when gaining privileges */
>  #ifdef __alpha__
>  	unsigned int taso:1;
>  #endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 080f34e66017..d1bd24fb4a33 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -72,7 +72,8 @@
>   *	Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
>   *	is required.  The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
>   *	on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
> - *	should enable secure mode.
> + *	should enable secure mode. Called before bprm_committing_creds(),
> + *	so pending credentials are in @bprm->cred.
>   *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
>   *
>   * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 7abebd782d5e..482d3aac2fc6 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -624,12 +624,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
>   * if it is not.
>   *
> - * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
> - * available through @bprm->cred.
>   */
>  int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +	const struct cred *cred = bprm->cred;
>  	kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0);
>  
>  	if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 819fd6858b49..9381c8474cf4 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  
>  static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> -	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
> +	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = bprm->cred->security;
>  	u32 sid, osid;
>  	int atsecure = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 658f5d8c7e76..13cf9e66d5fe 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   */
>  static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> -	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
> +	struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
>  
>  	if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
>  		return 1;
--
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