[PATCH] userns: honour no_new_privs for cap_bset during user ns creation/switch
Eric W. Biederman
ebiederm at xmission.com
Fri Dec 22 14:21:38 UTC 2017
Aleksa Sarai <asarai at suse.de> writes:
> On 2017-12-21, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com> wrote:
>> Good point about CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE on files you own.
>> I think there is an argument that you are playing dangerous games with
>> the permission system there, as it isn't effectively a file you own if
>> you can't read it, and you can't change it's permissions.
> This problem reminds me of the whole "unmapped group" problem. If you
> have access to a file through an unmapped group you can still access a
> file -- which to me is wrong. I understand the need for checking
> unmapped groups in order to fix the "chmod 707" problem, but I think
> that unmapped groups should only *block* access and never *grant* it.
> I was working on a patch for that issue a while ago but it touched more
> VFS than I was comfortable with. Eric, is that a fix you would be
> interested in?
I am not certain. I don't see how there is a problem with an unmapped
group granting permissions. You are talking about a scenario where a
more privileged login program set your groups, and uid and gid. The
process despite being a user namespace does not have permission to
transition them. As such I don't see the harm.
But spell it out for me, and deal with ensuring we don't have user space
regressions and I will take a patch that improves the security of user
I think the issue that raised all of this is that dropping a group can
in rare instances increase permissions. I have heard people grumble at
me that the way I handle it with /etc/subuid might break things on some
people's systems. AKA don't allow it by default but allow root to
configure a way for people using user namespaces to do that. I have yet
to see someone come forward and say that is a problem in the real world.
If it actually is a problem I want to hear about it.
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