[PATCH v3 3/4] sctp: Add LSM hooks
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
marcelo.leitner at gmail.com
Fri Dec 22 13:05:18 UTC 2017
From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines at btinternet.com>
Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control
over SCTP.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines at btinternet.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner at gmail.com>
---
include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++
include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 +
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 18 ++++++++++++++
net/sctp/socket.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
index 9942ed5159448c924f0f018abeea9bab93fc3437..2ca0a3f7f043316d15d9d0998f035a0820bac1a3 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -1271,6 +1271,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
reconf_enable:1;
__u8 strreset_enable;
+
+ /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by
+ * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by
+ * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they
+ * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone()
+ * will then plug these into the new socket.
+ */
+
+ u32 secid;
+ u32 peer_secid;
};
/* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
index 6217ff8500a1d818fd1002fbd6f81c0c11974665..c04812f41068fd50978ebb6cf2578c7750c86efe 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t;
#define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120
#define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121
#define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122
+#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123
/* PR-SCTP policies */
#define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index ca8f196b6c6c106386a65c75dccd7bc3451798ff..140e45b931ee83c835eddce693ec51a94d19b26a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -3054,6 +3054,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
+ if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
+ SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ af->sockaddr_len))
+ return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+
/* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
* request and does not have the local resources to add this
* new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
@@ -3120,6 +3126,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
+ if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk,
+ SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ af->sockaddr_len))
+ return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+
peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8f8ccded13e47c4b5403b5a27416b0d5707d1f33..a2dfc5ad17921987ddd35190a5d36460b3f7e558 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
struct sctp_packet *packet;
int len;
+ /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+ if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+ chunk->skb))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
@@ -905,6 +910,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net,
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL());
+ /* Set peer label for connection. */
+ security_inet_conn_established(ep->base.sk, chunk->skb);
+
/* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association
*
* E) Upon reception of the COOKIE ACK, endpoint "A" will move
@@ -1433,6 +1441,11 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
struct sctp_packet *packet;
int len;
+ /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+ if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+ chunk->skb))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
@@ -2103,6 +2116,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(
}
}
+ /* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+ if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+ chunk->skb))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Set temp so that it won't be added into hashtable */
new_asoc->temp = 1;
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 274082cf49a8380fda06866c631cdc22dc4f157b..d7822da004e90f12e523b132491d177d37468753 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -1015,6 +1015,12 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk,
/* Do the work. */
switch (op) {
case SCTP_BINDX_ADD_ADDR:
+ /* Allow security module to validate bindx addresses. */
+ err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD,
+ (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs,
+ addrs_size);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
err = sctp_bindx_add(sk, kaddrs, addrcnt);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -1224,6 +1230,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk,
if (assoc_id)
*assoc_id = asoc->assoc_id;
+
err = sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo);
/* Note: the asoc may be freed after the return of
* sctp_wait_for_connect.
@@ -1337,9 +1344,17 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
+ /* Allow security module to validate connectx addresses. */
+ err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX,
+ (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs,
+ addrs_size);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+
err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id);
}
+out_free:
kfree(kaddrs);
return err;
@@ -1606,6 +1621,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
struct sctp_transport *transport, *chunk_tp;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
union sctp_addr to;
+ struct sctp_af *af;
struct sockaddr *msg_name = NULL;
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo default_sinfo;
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo;
@@ -1835,6 +1851,24 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
}
scope = sctp_scope(&to);
+
+ /* Label connection socket for first association 1-to-many
+ * style for client sequence socket()->sendmsg(). This
+ * needs to be done before sctp_assoc_add_peer() as that will
+ * set up the initial packet that needs to account for any
+ * security ip options (CIPSO/CALIPSO) added to the packet.
+ */
+ af = sctp_get_af_specific(to.sa.sa_family);
+ if (!af) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+ af->sockaddr_len);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
new_asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_asoc) {
err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2867,6 +2901,8 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
{
struct sctp_prim prim;
struct sctp_transport *trans;
+ struct sctp_af *af;
+ int err;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_prim))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2874,6 +2910,17 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_prim)))
return -EFAULT;
+ /* Allow security module to validate address but need address len. */
+ af = sctp_get_af_specific(prim.ssp_addr.ss_family);
+ if (!af)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&prim.ssp_addr,
+ af->sockaddr_len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
trans = sctp_addr_id2transport(sk, &prim.ssp_addr, prim.ssp_assoc_id);
if (!trans)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3196,6 +3243,13 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optva
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ /* Allow security module to validate address. */
+ err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&prim.sspp_addr,
+ af->sockaddr_len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
/* Create an ASCONF chunk with SET_PRIMARY parameter */
chunk = sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(asoc,
(union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr);
@@ -8038,6 +8092,8 @@ void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk,
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *newinet;
+ struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
+ struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
newsk->sk_type = sk->sk_type;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
@@ -8080,7 +8136,10 @@ void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk,
if (newsk->sk_flags & SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP)
net_enable_timestamp();
- security_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+ /* Set newsk security attributes from orginal sk and connection
+ * security attribute from ep.
+ */
+ security_sctp_sk_clone(ep, sk, newsk);
}
static inline void sctp_copy_descendant(struct sock *sk_to,
--
2.14.3
--
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