[PATCH V3 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes

[Andy Lutomirski]

--Andy
> On Aug 25, 2017, at 11:51 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com> wrote:
> 
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto at kernel.org):
>>> On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 3:12 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com> wrote:
>>> Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
>>> uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.
>>> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
>>> ---
>>> security/commoncap.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>> 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>> 
>>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>>> index 36c38a1..1af7dec 100644
>>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>>> @@ -483,6 +483,15 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
>>> 
>>> static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
>>> 
>>> +static inline bool is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
>>> +{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
>> 
>> OK I guess, but this just seems like a way to obfuscate the code a bit
>> and save typing "->uid".
> 
> Personally I find the new to be far more readable.  In the old, the
> distinction between uid and euid is one character hidden in the middle
> of the expression.

Would real_uid_eq be better?

> 
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
>>> +{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
>> 
>> Ditto.
>> 
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
>>> +{ return !is_real(uid, cred) && is_eff(uid, cred); }
>> 
>> Please no.  This is IMO insane.  You're hiding really weird,
>> nonintuitive logic in an oddly named helper.
> 
> How is it nonintuitive?  It's very precisely checking that a
> nonroot user is executing something that results in euid=0.

I can think of several sensible predicated:

1. Are we execing a setuid-root program, where the setuod bit wasn't suppressed by nnp, mount options, trace, etc?

2. Same as 1, but also require that we weren't root.

3. Is the new euid 0 and old uid != 0?

4. Does suid == 0?

This helper checks something equivalent to 3, but only once were far enough through exec and before user code starts.  This is probably equivalent to 2 as well.  This is quite subtle and deserves an open-coded check, a much more carefully named helper, or, better yet, something that looks at binprm instead of cred.

is_suid sounds like #4.

> That's what it's checking for, the name of the new helper makes
> that clear, and the code becomes clearer because we only see the
> thing we care about checking for rather than the intent being
> hidden.


> 
>> Also, this is going to cause massive confusion and severe bugs: given
>> the same, the only remotely sensible guess as to what this function
>> does is uid_eq(cred->suid, uid).  So NAK to this.
>> 
>>> +
>>> void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
>>> {
>>>        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
>>> @@ -493,7 +502,7 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effe
>>>         * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
>>>         * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
>>>         */
>>> -       if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
>>> +       if (has_fcap && is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
>> 
>> e.g. this.  The logic used to be obviously slightly dicey.  Now it
>> looks sane but doesn't do what you'd naively expect it to do, which is
>> far worse.
> 
> In what way does not do what you'd expect?

It doesn't look at cred->suid.--
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