[PATCH V3 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root

James Morris jmorris at namei.org
Fri Aug 25 05:55:20 UTC 2017


On Wed, 23 Aug 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:

> Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
> cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
> 
> Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/commoncap.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
>  1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 78b3783..b7fbf77 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -481,6 +481,38 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> +void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)

Can this be static?


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris at namei.org>

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