[PATCH v6 5/6] ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Tue Aug 22 12:54:54 UTC 2017
On Tue, 2017-08-22 at 13:07 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 5:43 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > Permit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy
> > on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe"
> > policy action rule.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >
> > ---
> > Changelog v3:
> > - include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy
> > - fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy
> >
> > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > index e76432b9954d..f271207743e5 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description:
> >
> > rule format: action [condition ...]
> >
> > - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
> > + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise |
> > + audit | dont_failsafe
> > condition:= base | lsm [option]
> > base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
> > [euid=] [fowner=]]
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > index d52b487ad259..c5f34f7c5b0f 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
> > void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
> > void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
> > int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
> > +void set_failsafe(bool flag);
> >
> > /* Appraise integrity measurements */
> > #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index d23dfe6ede18..b00186914df8 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise;
> > int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> > static int hash_setup_done;
> >
> > +static bool ima_failsafe = 1;
> > +void set_failsafe(bool flag)
> > +{
> > + ima_failsafe = flag;
> > +}
> > +
> > static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
> > {
> > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
> > @@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> > __putname(pathbuf);
> > out:
> > inode_unlock(inode);
> > - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
> > + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
> > + if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF)
> > + return 0;
> > +
>
> By default IMA is failsafe. ima_failsafe is true.
> Return 0 is needed in failsafe mode. right?
> But in this logic it will happen if ima_failsafe is false. meaning it
> is not failsafe.
>
> Is it a typo?
No, the default, as you pointed out above, is failsafe mode. Only when we are not in failsafe mode, do we allow the file access/execute for file's that we could not appraise.
Mimi
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