[PATCH v4 2/5] ima: use fs method to read integrity data [updated]
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Wed Aug 2 17:11:52 UTC 2017
On Wed, 2017-08-02 at 10:01 +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Tue 01-08-17 16:24:30, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > From: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
> >
> > Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity
> > hash collection. This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter,
> > except that it will be called with the i_rwsem held exclusively.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett at nebula.com>
> > Cc: Jan Kara <jack at suse.com>
> > Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso at mit.edu>
> > Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel at dilger.ca>
> > Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk at kernel.org>
> > Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0 at huawei.com>
> > Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho at redhat.com>
> > Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso at redhat.com>
> > Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org>
> > Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy at kernel.org>
> > Cc: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke at lab.ntt.co.jp>
> > Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh at versity.com>
> > Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec at evilplan.org>
> > Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard at nod.at>
> > Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong at oracle.com>
> > Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd at google.com>
> > Cc: Chris Mason <clm at fb.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>
> ...
>
> > +static ssize_t ext4_file_integrity_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
> > + struct iov_iter *to)
> > +{
> > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
> > + int o_direct = iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held(&inode->i_rwsem);
> > + if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb))))
> > + return -EIO;
> > +
> > + if (!iov_iter_count(to))
> > + return 0; /* skip atime */
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
> > + if (IS_DAX(inode))
> > + return dax_iomap_rw(iocb, to, &ext4_iomap_ops);
> > +#endif
> > + if (o_direct)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + return generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
> > +}
>
> I have noticed this o_direct check - why is it only in ext4 and shouldn't
> rather higher layers make sure IOCB_DIRECT iocbs cannot reach
> .integrity_read() methods?
This failure happens when opening a file with O_DIRECT on a block
device that does not support dax (eg. loop). xfs makes it to here too,
but the call to generic_file_read_iter() fails properly with -EINVAL.
(Only tested on those filesystems included that support dax (eg. ext2,
ext4, and xfs).)
Mimi
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