

CC3: An Identity Attested Linux Security Supervisor Architecture

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The State of Security

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VS

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Security is economically constrained.

Irreversible Compromises

- Life safety systems.
- Privileged healthcare information.
- Personally sensitive information.



No ex-post-facto redress.

In the Beginning - NHIN

- Greatest identity problem in the world.
- 2008 CC1/2
 - Deterministic location of medical records in under five seconds over 3 million+ provider identities.
- Network perimeter defined by integrity verified platforms.
- Required mobile/autonomous devices.



CC3 Architecture

"All things equal, complexity loses. All things not quite equal – ditto."

– Al Viro, LKML



Will general purpose OS distributions remain relevant?



ComDel Innovation
ISO 9001:2000

System Components

- Security bootloader – sboot.
 - Initializes system identity and root filesystem.
- System security supervisor – sinit.
 - Attests and maintains platform behavioral status.
- Environment launchers:
 - Native binaries.
 - Virtual machines.
 - Containerized systems.



13 megabyte base
system load

Identity Attested Remote Attestation

- Implemented with POSSUM.
- Authenticated with OTEDKS.
 - Epoch/identity based key generation.
 - Validated with NIST randomization tests over a 32 bit time epoch.
- IVY 'identity cartridges' encapsulate counter-party information.



Autonomous Attestation



ID Fusion

DakTech Assembly
And Support

Iso-Identity Integrity Measurement Architecture

"In the future, company names will be a 32 character hex string"

– Bruce Schneier



$$I_M = H_M(R_M || H_M(C))$$

I3MA Platform Model

- Premise 1
 - Interaction of actor and subject identities yield a behavior identity.
- Premise 2
 - Platform behavior is full set of behavioral identities.
- Premise 3
 - Platform measurement is time invariant extension sum of device identity extended platform behaviors.



Multi-variate platform behavioral modeling.

Behavioral Compromise Modeling

- Extra-dimensional.
 - Platform behavior goes 'off-contour'.
 - Detectable by integrity measurement.
- Intra-dimensional.
 - Platform behavior remains 'on-contour'.
 - Requires probabilistic methods.



Mathematical limit of integrity measurement.

iso-identity IMA policy

Policy:

```
map func=BPRM_CHECK capability=any
map func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC capability=any
map func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
map func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ capability=any
```

Capability based measurement triggers:

$$A_{\text{MASK}} = P_{\text{MASK}} \wedge (Eff_{\text{MASK}} \vee Per_{\text{MASK}})$$



Subject Pseudonyms

- Implemented to avoid issues with writable files, eg password, log files.
- Configured by security supervisor during system initialization process.
- Synthetic file hash derived from platform identity.
- Overrides TOMTOU/open-writers violations.
- Removed by security_inode_unlink().



Securityfs Interface

/sys/kernel/security/ima/iso-identity

```
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 contours
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 forensics
--w----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 host_identity
--w----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 map
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 measurement
--w----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 pseudonym
--w----- 1 root root 0 Aug 11 02:31 sealed
```

Sealing platform disables further configurations and enables forensics.



Development and mgmt.
of behavioral model.

Current Work

- System upgrade management.
- Integrating mandatory access labels.
- Support for ambient capabilities.
- Implementing behavioral namespaces.



Role of behavioral attestation in re-insurance and indemnification?